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Abstract 
Joseph Schwab’s famous remark, that the field of curriculum is ‘moribund’—no longer able ‘to 
…contribute significantly to the advancement of education’—has long echoed in curriculum
studies. Although its specific meaning has certainly changed, it still rings in our ears today. It 
now applies as much to discussions in the US and UK as it does to those in Northern Europe—
where the cognate field of General Didaktik has been described as ‘quiet’ (Terhart, 2003, p. 25), 
or more recently, ‘dead’ (Zierer & Seel 2012, p. 16). This ‘virtual issue’ of the Journal of 
Curriculum Studies brings together five articles of direct relevance to the contemporary ‘crisis’ 
in transatlantic studies of curriculum and instruction that also share a common focus on the 
question of curricular content. ‘None of the many traditional American educational approaches 
have paid serious attention to the “school subject” or “instructional content,”’ as Westbury and 
Doyle have pointed out (1992, p. 137); and others in curriculum studies see this as the underlying 
reason for its ongoing crisis. This introduction provides an overview of each article included and 
concludes by outlining a few of the possibilities and challenges presented by questions of 
‘content’ and ‘knowledge’ in curriculum studies. 
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Starting a Dialogue 
One would think that cross-cultural and intra-linguistic comparisons would be at least a tacit component of work in 
curriculum studies as an internationalized field of research. However, as Hopmann and Riquarts make clear, efforts at 
a transatlantic dialogue between the continental and English-speaking world began only with their 1995 article 
“Starting a dialogue,” the first in this virtual issue. They admit that there have been moments of influence between 
Didaktik and English-speaking curriculum at various points in history. For example, there is the highly appreciative 
American reception of German educational and instructional ideas in the late 19th century. There is also the more 
recent adoption of American ideas of curriculum in Germany in the 1970s and ‘80s.  Regardless, Hopmann and 
Riquarts conclude their brief article by saying: “Both traditions” do not at all “know each other well enough” (p. 8). 
And based on “a strong belief that we need an integrative approach” to address common concerns, the authors 
recommend that both traditions make an explicit effort at mutual acquaintanceship (pp. 8-9). 
In introducing Didaktik to their English-speaking readers, Hopmann and Riquarts helpfully explain that it conceives 
of teaching in terms of the Didaktik triangle, a “model” which brings into connection ‘the content, the learner and the 
teacher’ (p. 4). In so doing, it fulfills a key requirement that arose with mass schooling in the 16th century, and that 
became even more urgent with increasing administrative centralization in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Didaktik 
triangle provides a framework that, as Hopmann and Riquarts explain, that ‘enables [general] state directives to be 
translated by teachers into [the particularities of] classroom practice… [a] conventional way… to construct as well as 
to translate these guidelines’ (p. 4). To understand how this triangle may be applied, however, it is necessary to take 
on a manner of thought that might seem quite a departure from the ways that curriculum is schematized in English-
language contexts. This ‘other’ way of thinking is one that embraces teaching and learning as primarily relational 
activities, and that sees these as structured through tensions and contradictions: The didactic triangle delineates how 
the teacher relates to both student and content, and how this same teacher works to affect and mediate the student’s 
relation to the content—without any of these relations and tensions being minimized or resolved (figure 1; e.g., see: 
xxx & Osguthorpe, 2018). It thus provides teachers with ways of assessing content—both according to state mandates 
and according to the particular situation of the student and the class. 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal 
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Figure 1: The Didaktik triangle (from 
xxx & Osguthorpe 2018) 
Figure 2: ‘The component phases of an instructional system’ 
(Adapted from Glaser, 1962).  
Models for teaching and instruction familiar in English almost invariably conceptualize the domain in terms of 
sequences and procedures. This reflects the very different relationship between teachers and curricular requirements 
in English-language contexts. In this case, principal concern is not the translation of general directives to specific 
circumstances, but rather the attainment of measured ‘instructional objectives’ through ‘instructional procedures’ (see 
figure 2). Of course, to conceive of curriculum and instruction primarily in processual terms—‘as a series of actions 
or operations conducing to an end’ (Merriam Webster)—means to focus precisely on this end and on the most efficient 
way to reach it. It is to place curriculum, in other words, in an instrumentalist or ‘technicist’ frame, generally to the 
detriment of those elements, to the student, teacher and content, that can be seen to constitute it. In addition, content 
in this context is seen as neither being differentiated in its types nor as having a specifically pedagogical form or 
nature. It becomes simply one of so many objectives and their assessment. 
Within curriculum studies, this technicist reduction of educational substance to questions of operation and efficiency 
has been critiqued, most prominently by William Pinar (2011) and reconceptualist curriculum studies (Pinar 1975). 
By concentrating on experience as ‘lived,’ the reconceptualists have sought above all to rescue the subjectivity of the 
individual, ultimately both student and teacher, from the machinery of curricular efficiency. However, the role and 
characteristics of curricular content are also overlooked in this critical approach. They are seen as merely part and 
parcel of a larger regime of indoctrination, testing and control imposed by political interests. 
 
 
Didaktik, Content and ‘Exemplarity’ 
Instructional content, however, has long been a central concern in theories of Didaktik. This is clear from the second 
article included in this virtual edition, which accompanied Hopmann and Riquarts’ ‘Starting a dialogue’ in 1995. This 
is a translation of Wolfgang Klafki’s ‘Didactic analysis as the core of preparation.’ Klafki (1927-2016), whose 
‘critical-constructive Didaktik’ is likely the most influential approach of its kind in postwar Germany, begins by 
emphasizing the German notion of Bildung (translated as ‘formation’ ‘development’ and/or ‘self-education’), meaning 
that he understands the education and growth of the child not so much in terms of ‘definable, special area[s] of 
knowledge, ability, attitude, or behavior, but [via] the world of the mind, the habits of the young person as a whole’ 
(p. 23). As illustrated below, this broad, even wholistic conception of education and growth serves as an indispensable 
frame of reference for Klafki’s conception of Didaktik, and is still an important reference point in debates and 
discussions related to education and its policies. Klakfi defines the titular notion of his article on teacher preparation 
in terms that reflect the inclusivity of Bildung and the structure of the Didaktik triangle: namely as the teacher’s work 
to mediate the students’ relation to the content in particular ways: ‘preparation is intended as the design of one or 
several opportunities [by the teacher] for certain children to make fruitful encounters with certain contents of 
education’ (p. 16). 
 
Klafki can be said to address content specifically through the unifying principle of the example, of exemplarity 
(Exemplarität). Whatever the object or content selected for a class or lesson, Klafki emphasizes, it is always something 
in particular, and it always exemplifies or ‘represents a larger set of cultural contents’ (p. 150). In this connection, 
Klafki differentiates between two aspects intrinsic to any piece of content that can be understood as specifically 
‘pedagogical:’ The first is its Bildungsinhalt, referring simply to the content on its own, its own everyday meaning 
and function, or as Klafki says, its ‘inner meaning’ (p. 24). This might be a terrarium with bean sprouts in an 
elementary classroom, or a periodic table in high school chemistry. However, they can be used to teach or explore 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal 
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many different things, for many different ‘lessons.’ ‘One and the same item of content can exemplify a variety of 
general subjects,’ Klafki explains (p. 23).  Sprouting beans can exemplify plant life, gardening, even the food on our 
plates, just as the periodic table can be used to teach molecular physics or simply the idea of physical ‘elements’ per 
se. Klafki refers to the purpose to which educational material is directed as its ‘Bildungsgehalt,’ its educational 
substance. 
 
 
 
 
With this distinction between educational content and substance in mind, Klafki explains, any instructional item is to 
be subjected to five questions (or rather, sets of questions) that clarify its status as an exemplar. This is known as its 
‘Didaktik analysis’ in preparation for teaching. The first question is, ‘What wider or general sense or reality do these 
contents exemplify and open up to the learner?’ Or: ‘What … can be grasped by dealing with these contents as 
‘examples’?’ (p. 22). The second asks: How and ‘whether the content in question, i.e., the substance to be investigated 
in it, can and should be an element in the present education of the young people, i.e., in their lives, in their conception 
of themselves and the world, in their areas of competence’ (p. 23). The third question focuses on the students’ future, 
asking whether ‘this content’ will ‘play a vital role in the intellectual life of the adolescents and adults the children 
will become?’ (p. 24) Both the needs of children in the present and the demands placed on them by the future form an 
additional, productive but irresolvable tension that subtends both Didaktik and Klafki’s general conception of 
education. The four and fifth questions, finally, ask after the structure of the content, and about the concrete 
phenomena, situations or experiments through which this structure can be made ‘interesting, stimulating, 
approachable, conceivable, or vivid’ (p. 26). 
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Curriculum and ‘Powerful Knowledge’ 
The third article included in this issue has a similar focus on curricular content; and it also frames its response using 
the language of ‘crisis’ inaugurated by Joseph Schwab. Although it does not reference Northern European Didaktik 
explicitly, its framing of this curricular crisis and its response to it (as I will show) have effectively become a part of 
the ‘dialogue’ that Hopmann and Riquarts sought to initiate. This is UK scholar Michael Young’s ‘Overcoming the 
crisis in curriculum theory: a knowledge-based approach’ from 2013. Like Klafki, Young uses a question to define 
his approach to educational content, specifically, ‘what do students have an entitlement to learn?’ (p. 101; emphasis 
added). And like the Didaktik tradition in general, Young defines education as an activity that broadly defines us as 
humans: ‘…as educators, we have the responsibility to hand on to the next generation the knowledge discovered by 
earlier generations. It is this element of continuity between generations which distinguishes us from animals; it is a 
way of saying that we are always part of history’ (p. 101). 
On this basis, Young goes on to identify curriculum’s long-standing avoidance of questions of ‘knowledge’ as the 
principle grounds for its ongoing crisis. He describes this crisis as arising on the one hand from the ‘technicist’ 
approach to curricular efficiency, and on the other, from the response to technicism on the part of reconceptualist and 
related curriculum theorizing—labelling the latter ‘ideology critique.’ Young advocates for a ‘knowledge-based 
approach to the curriculum,’ saying that above all, what ‘curriculum theory needs’ is ‘a theory of knowledge’ (p. 107). 
He then takes it upon himself to provide the outlines of such a theory. 
Young articulates his theory under the aegis of what he calls ‘powerful knowledge.’ This is knowledge that is notably 
different from curricular ‘content’ as described above. It is not an item or piece of educational material that is 
exemplary—that has been made meaningful to students in terms of their present and future. It is instead ‘knowledge 
that is worthwhile in itself,’ (Young p. 117; emphasis added). Its value exists independently of any educational or 
curricular significance or purpose. Students should be told, Young says, that they should ‘never apologize that they 
need to learn’ such knowledge (p. 117).  It is above all knowledge that is specialized and disciplinary in nature: It is 
‘specialized,’ Young explains, ‘in how it is produced (in workshops, seminars and labs) and in how it is transmitted 
(in schools, colleges and universities) and this specialization is expressed in the boundaries between disciplines and 
subjects’ (p. 108; emphasis in original). As a result, Young continues, it is ‘not general knowledge,’ and is thus to be 
‘differentiated from the experiences that pupils bring to school or older learners bring to college or university’ (p. 108; 
emphasis in original). 
Further moments of convergence and divergence between Klafki’s conception of content and Young’s powerful 
knowledge are significant: Like Klafki, Young implies that the point of his powerful knowledge is not simply to 
‘replace a pupil’s everyday experience.’ Instead (and despite its differentiation from everyday knowledge), Young 
says that it builds on and ‘extends that experience,’ giving the child the possibility ‘to generalize about’ what he or 
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she experiences everyday. However, unlike Klafki, whose Didaktik analysis repeatedly emphasizes the relation of 
what is being learned to students’ ‘conception of themselves and the world,’ Young sees this knowledge as ultimately 
indifferent to students’ interests: ‘[A]lthough knowledge can be experienced as oppressive and alienating,’ Young 
admits, ‘this is not a property of knowledge itself. An appropriate pedagogy,’ he continues ‘can have the opposite 
consequences––it can free the learner to have new thoughts and even think the ‘not yet thought’’ (p. 107). But in the 
final analysis, what is important for Young is not how this knowledge is taught, but rather, ‘the commitment’ of the 
learner ‘to a relationship to’ such powerful ‘knowledge’ (p. 107). The student has the entitlement to acquire knowledge 
that has been deemed ‘powerful;’ but it is ultimately up to the student to realize this entitlement. 
 
 
 
 
 
Didaktik, Curriculum and the Power of Knowledge 
It is precisely a comparison and contrast between Klafki’s Didaktik and this notion of ‘powerful knowledge’ that is at 
the heart of the fourth and final article in this virtual issue. This is Zongyi Deng’s ‘Content, Joseph Schwab and 
German Didaktik’ (2015). Here, Deng takes up Young’s response to the crisis in curriculum studies and connects it 
back to Klafki and German Didaktik, revisiting Schwab’s conception of curriculum along the way. Deng begins by 
affirming Schwab’s infamous declaration of crisis in curriculum studies, and expands on the reasons for its current 
protraction: ‘much contemporary curriculum theory is characterized by what Schwab …called ‘a flight from [the] 
subject of the field,’ that is, by a turn’ away from content (among other things). This is also a turn, Deng emphasizes, 
towards ‘issues of power, politics, race, gender, etc. and to fashionable discourses such as sexuality, post-modernism, 
post-structuralism, postcolonialism…’ (p. 774). Although he is most appreciative of Young’s work to ‘bring 
knowledge back in’ to curriculum discourse (p. 774; emphasis in original), Deng takes issue with Young’s insistence 
on ‘powerful knowledge’ as something ‘worthwhile in itself.’ Young and his colleagues, according to Deng, ‘fail to 
explain how powerful knowledge has to be ‘unlocked’ and transformed to bring about the cultivation of…  intellectual 
and moral powers or capacities of students’ (p. 775). They have failed, in other words, to show how knowledge can 
become meaningful as curriculum or as curricular content. It is in his consideration of ways of achieving this 
‘unlocking’ or ‘transformation’ of knowledge to become pedagogically meaningful content that Deng makes use of 
both Schwab’s curriculum theory and Klafki’s critical-constructive Didaktik. 
Working independently from Klafki and German Didaktik, Schwab, as Deng explains, developed a curricular theory 
based on the ‘structure of the disciplines’ that sees educational content as having multiple aspects or ‘faces:’ The first, 
its ‘purport,’ ‘that which it [the material] conveys’ (Schwab 1973, p. 515) can be seen as being the effective equivalent 
of Klafki’s Bildungsinhalt, the content’s manifest ‘inner meaning.’ Reading ‘The Practical 3: Translation into 
Curriculum’ one can identify two further Schwabian aspects of content as variations on Klafki’s educational substance 
or Bildungsgehalt: The first refers to the ‘disciplinary origin’ of the content. The educational substance of a bean seed 
or the periodic table has a clear disciplinary association: The germinating seed is most readily used to teach lessons 
related to biology or ecology, while the periodic table obviously has its disciplinary origin in chemistry. Schwab thinks 
of this in terms of the knowledge of singular disciplinary structures, methods, and controversies from which the 
particular content emerged, and which form the ultimate aim of any given curriculum, broadly speaking. The second 
aspect of a given piece of educational content is named by Schwab its ‘access disciplines,’ referring to the varying 
lessons, topics and the other disciplinary teaching possibilities that the given material can afford. 
In further exploring how knowledge might be thus mobilized educationally, Deng provides an overview of the 
elements of Klafki’s critical constructive Didaktik that largely parallels the one provided above. Deng then concludes 
that Schwab’s curriculum theory ‘is largely compatible with German Didaktik:’ ‘Both hold the development of self-
understanding, human intellectual and moral powers as a central aim of education. Both view academic disciplines as 
an important resource for achieving such an aim’ (pp. 781-782). What is most important for Deng, however, is the 
development of intellectual and moral powers, which he sees as clearly superseding any intrinsic value that content or 
knowledge may bring with it. As a result, for Deng, it is not a question (as Michael Young puts it) of what knowledge 
students are most ‘entitled to learn.’ Instead, it is a question of what content can most effectively serve as a ‘resource 
for achieving… the development of intellectual and moral powers and capacities of students’ (p. 775; emphasis in 
original). 
The point of his cross-cultural curricular comparison, as Deng informs us, is ‘to extend and deepen the conversation’ 
(p. 775). However, in so doing, Deng raises significant questions about how precisely curricular content is ‘to be 
‘unlocked’ and ‘transformed’ to become material that would meet the moral and intellectual educational aims he has 
identified. However, for this question to be addressed, Deng makes it clear that much theoretical work is first needed. 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal 
of Curriculum Studies, published by Routledge. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1080/00220272.2018.1537377 
5 
In a rather dense sentence in his conclusion, Deng explains that what is now required is a theory of knowledge or 
content that 1) ‘elucidates [how] the… theories and methods… of a particular knowledge type [can] contribute to the 
cultivation of intellectual and moral capacities;’ 2) ‘that addresses how knowledge is selected and transformed into 
curriculum content;’ and 3) that shows ‘how such potential can be disclosed or unlocked by teachers in a classroom 
situation’ (p. 782). 
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Conclusion: Knowledge and Content, Alienation and Subjectivity 
Young and Deng are right, I believe, in emphasizing the need for new and different ways of understanding knowledge 
in the light of its centrality to curriculum. Deng’s call for theory ‘that addresses how knowledge is selected and 
transformed into curriculum content’ in particular highlights something that has long been missing in curricular 
discourse. However, a quick survey of fields such as the sociology of knowledge or philosophical epistemology shows 
that theories of knowledge with the breadth and flexibility implied in this criterion (and in others identified by Deng) 
are in short supply. For example, Karl Mannheim’s structural theory of knowledge or Berger and Luckmann’s social 
construction of knowledge would be of little help. 
Particularly the first of Deng’s requirements, that the content and methods of a specific knowledge type (e.g., the 
scientific method, historical investigation) be linked to the development of student capacities, seems especially 
challenging. This is illustrated by the familiar fact/value distinction. Simply put, what is true or factual, and the 
methods and theories used to establish it as such, is not the same thing as what is right or valuable. The content and 
structure proper to a discipline tends to develop and be debated in ways that are deliberately isolated from questions 
about their developmental or moral value. Indeed, rigorous knowledge—for example, about the cruelties intrinsic to 
any national history, or the indifference of the laws of physics to activity in the playground—do not on their own lend 
themselves to the moral development of an expanding intellect. In terms of Didaktik, one might say that the value of 
such knowledge would depend on how the student is able to relate to it, and how the teacher is able to mediate this 
relationship to it. 
The indifference of facts and disciplinary methods to moral and intellectual development raises further questions about 
Michael Young’s claim that powerful knowledge is in itself neither inherently oppressive nor alienating. Think simply 
of a child in grade six learning that not everyone holds her father’s political opinions. Or of young people learning 
what scientific methods have revealed about the deteriorating global environment they will inherit. Disciplinary 
knowledge—from histories of colonial exploitation through physics to the environmental sciences—tend not to 
provide comforting and familiar accounts about the world around one. ‘The truth,’ as the saying goes, ‘sometimes 
hurts.’ This is recognized, for example, in understandings of ‘Bildung’ that underpin Klafki’s Didaktik. 
Alienation and self-alienation are seen as indispensible components of Bildung as the process or experience of 
formation and self-formation. Wilhelm von Humboldt famously wrote of the alienation inherent in human striving to 
‘reach beyond [one]self to the external objects’ that through Bildung are ‘integrated’ into the self. Others have more 
recently characterized the moment-by-moment experience of learning as occurring at the uncertain threshold between 
‘no longer and not yet’—between moments in which the familiar is lost, but not yet replaced by anything yet clearly 
known (Mayer Drawe, as quoted in xxx, 2017). Even John Dewey spoke of the ‘self-alienation’ that is a part of ‘the 
mind giv[ing] up its immediate interests and go[ing] on [the] far journey’ of higher learning (2008, p. 52). 
The separation of fact and value, and the alienation involved in intellectual and moral development brings this 
concluding discussion to a second point: Namely the undeniable reality of the subjectivity of the pupil, student or 
learner in the educational context. It is worth noting that in the dynamic of the conversation between Didaktik and 
curriculum covered above, the identities, backgrounds and experiences of the generations of students who are to 
acquire knowledge or develop intellectually and morally are little discussed. The one exception is Klafki, whose 
conception of the Didaktik triangle and the Didaktik of teacher preparation repeatedly emphasizes the importance of 
students and their world.  In Young’s case, though, student subjectivity appears as important only insofar as it might 
contribute to or detract from the student’s ‘commitment…to a relationship to’ powerful knowledge. The one place 
where the position, experience or subjectivity of the learner is otherwise referenced is in Young’s mention of ‘ideology 
critique’ and Deng’s unflattering characterization of ‘fashionable discourses such as sexuality, post-modernism, post-
structuralism, postcolonialism’—which focus on issues such as ‘power, politics, race [and] gender’ (p. 774). It is 
precisely in these discourses and theories, rather than in those of Schwab, Young or Deng, where issues of experience 
and subjectivity can be said to be given their due. 
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My point in mentioning these discourses of ‘power, politics, race [and] gender’ is not to take the side of ‘ideology 
critique’ or of reconceptualist curriculum studies, however. My point here is instead to emphasize that any theory of 
knowledge that would connect disciplinary knowledge to moral and intellectual development must pay serious 
attention to students’ subjective relation to this knowledge—whether this relation is one of integration or alienation, 
understanding or confusion. Instead of relying exclusively on teachers’ transformation of the knowledge in the 
classroom, it is important to have an approach to knowledge that also sees learning and the learner as having an active, 
dynamic relation to it. Indeed, the decades-long ascendency of reconceptualist theory and ideology critique in 
curriculum studies can be seen as a manifestation of the irrepressible importance of these considerations. What would 
be valuable, I suggest, is a conception of knowledge, its development, circulation and educational transformation that 
would have a place both for its ‘power’ and also for students’ participation in its transformation in the classroom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal 
of Curriculum Studies, published by Routledge. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1080/00220272.2018.1537377 
One possible example of such an approach to knowledge and its inter-generational dynamism, I believe, can be found 
in a source which might initially seem much closer to Young’s relative conservatism than to the political radicalism 
sometimes characteristic of reconceptualism and ideology critique. However, I believe that it may contribute, in some 
small way, the conversation referenced throughout this paper. It has the potential to do so, I believe, by simultaneously 
addressing both the marginalization of student subjectivity in Young, Deng and Schwab and the marginalization of 
curricular contents in critical and reconceptualist curriculum theories. This is the ‘theory’ of knowledge represented 
by hermeneutics. It has been articulated in various ways by a range of thinkers since Schleiermacher, from Wilhelm 
Dilthey to Paul Ricoeur. 
However, for the purposes of illustration, I focus on H.G. Gadamer’s Truth and Method, particularly the section titled 
‘Language as the Medium of hermeneutic Experience.’ Here, Gadamer gives philosophical treatment to the example 
of a piece of content or knowledge, specifically in written form. He does so by focusing on the transformation that 
occurs when this written knowledge is turned back into speech, when it is read, or rather, read aloud—for example, 
in a lecture or a reading of a (hi)story: 
In writing, the meaning of what is spoken exists purely for itself, completely detached from all 
emotional elements of expression and communication…. Hence the meaning of something written 
is fundamentally identifiable and repeatable. What is identical in the repetition is only what was 
actually deposited in the written record. (2006, p. 394) 
Something written, an element of knowledge or content—for example, one included in the day’s lesson plan—is 
something that is, on its own, self-identical and self-sufficient. The content of my copy of the periodic table is identical 
to yours. Somewhat like Schwab’s notion of ‘purport’ or Klafki’s manifest content (Bildungsinhalt), it, and the 
disciplinary theory and methods behind it, exist in this sense outside of questions of value, purpose and application. 
However, in being read (ideally aloud) and in some sense also understood, its status, according to Gadamer, is utterly 
transformed. What was earlier self-sufficient and self-contained, and in this sense alien to us and even to its own 
possible meaning, is brought into greater proximity and familiarity. Gadamer explains this by referring to the written 
tradition as a whole: 
Writing is self-alienation. Overcoming it, reading the text, is thus the highest task of 
Understanding [sic]. […] Through it[,] tradition becomes part of our own world, and thus what it 
communicates can be stated immediately. Where we have a written tradition, we are not just told a 
particular thing; a past humanity itself becomes present to us in its general relation to the world. 
[…] It does not present us with only a stock of memorials and signs. Rather, literature has acquired 
its own contemporaneity with every present. To understand it does not mean primarily to reason 
one's way back into the past, but to have a present involvement in what is said. (pp. 392, 393) 
Gadamer adds to this discussion the following sententious claim: 
The understanding of something written is not a repetition of something past but the sharing of a 
present meaning. (p. 394) 
When something is read aloud, when it is understood, it is not mechanically repeated or self-identical. Instead it 
becomes part of ‘our own world’—‘our’ world, both in the sense of individual and shared experience. It acquires ‘its 
own contemporaneity’ with the present. To learn, for example, how a bean seed can be caused to sprout, or to 
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‘understand’ the periodic table, is to connect it with what is relevant in one’s present, to have ‘a present involvement’ 
with the otherwise self-sufficient content or knowledge. Teachers may of course have an important role in influencing 
what this involvement might be—for example, by highlighting particular aspects of its educational substance 
(Bildungsgehalt), or its relevance to students’ present and future. However, a significant part of this present 
involvement depends on the subjectivity of the students, the contingencies of their ‘contemporaneity,’ their 
historically-conditioned sense of themselves and their future. Simply speaking and discussing aloud words like 
‘democracy’ or ‘totalitarianism’ after Brexit and Trump, for example, invoke a notably different significance and 
resonance—whether for students or teachers—than they possessed beforehand. ‘Social media’ or ‘climate change,’ as 
further examples, may possess a rather different ‘contemporaneity’ for young students than they might for their 
teachers or parents. In grappling with these and other perhaps more mundane topics, students and children bring their 
own value and can even be said to understand these in their own way. It is students and student subjectivity, in short, 
that plays a significant role in realizing the utility of any given content as resource for intellectual and moral 
development. 
 
 
 
I believe that overcoming any crisis in curriculum studies does not mean leaving behind questions such as race, 
ethnicity or sexuality in our increasingly diverse classrooms, but in understanding what such diversity can bring. It is 
a question on the one hand of finding a balance between student subjectivity and powerful knowledge and teacher 
ability, and on the other, of seeing the ‘triangulation’ of all three of these elements as integral to any transformation 
or unlocking of curricular substance that happens in the classroom. 
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